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Preface
Adolf Hitler's view of his own political mission rested upon the
basis of his W eltanschauung 1 and was therefore primarily a commitment to an ideology rather than a course of action dictated by
pragmatic considerations. At the center of his ideology lay a personal belief that man's problems can and must be solved by force
alone. 2 The preeminence of the role of force in Hitler's thinking
was closely tied to his idea of what constitutes a strong and healthy
nation. He saw the major cause of the decline of Germany after
World War I as her inability to maintain the purity of the race just
as he attributed the decline of all civilizations throughout history
to a simple case of "blood poisoning" by inferior peoples. 3 Although
Hitler never defined exactly what he meant by "race" or "Aryan,"
he used these terms to demonstrate that there existed a fundamental
inequality between peoples and nations.
In his mind, inequality was a law of nature and, as he reasoned
in Mein Kampf, "All world historical events are only the expression
of the racial instinct of self-preservation" of racial purity.4 A political system which was based upon equality of individuals and which
operated on the basis of majority decisions he looked upon as the
source of all the evils which had befallen mankind. Hitler publicly
stated that there "are two closely related factors which we were
able to trace time and time again in periods of national decline. One
is that the levelling idea of the supremacy of the numbers-called
democracy-is substituted for the concept of the value of the
individual personality, and the other is . . . the denial of any
difference in the inborn capacity of individual peoples." 5 Internationalism and democracy were therefore rejected in favor of a
racially based nationalism and an elitist individualism. But individualism in Hitler's understanding of the word had nothing to do
with the personal liberties and individual rights common to western
tradition. "National Socialism takes as the starting point . . .
1. The term W eltanschauung in its original meaning ( as used by Wilhelm Dilthey)
stood for man's attempt to embrace entire reality in his philosophy of life. See Gerhard
Masur, Prophets of Yesterday: Studies in European Culture 1890-1914 (New York: Harper
Colophon Books, 1966 ), 164 ff.
Hitler, however, narrowed its meaning to an uncompromising ideological position
which served as the basis for the philosophy and the program of the National Socialist
German Workers Party.
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Muenchen: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Franz Eber Nachf.,
1944), p. 418.
3. Ibid., pp. 310, 316.
4 . Ibid., p. 324.
5. Speech by Adolf Hitler on January 27, 1932 at Duesseldorf, cited in Max Domarus
(ed.)l Hitler: Reden and Proklamationen 1932-1945, Vol. I: Triumph (2 vols.; Muenchen:
Suedaeutscher Verlag, 1965 ), 71.
V

neither the individual nor humanity. .
. It is important that
the individual should slowly come to realize that his own ego is
unimportant when compared with the existence of the whole
people. .
"6
"The individual is transitory," Hitler said, "the Volk is permanent."
National Socialism saw in the Volk "the blood conditioned entity"
and a "God-willed building stone of human society." 7 The function
of an individual thus became submerged in the organism of the
Volk, like a cell becomes part of a larger living organism. That a
racially alient element had no place in this organic body goes without saying. The maintenance of racial purity, which was necessary
to insure the growth of a healthy and vigorous Volk, became thus
one of the tasks of the Party.
But a growing Volk expands and expansion must mean contact
with racially inferior peoples, i. e., a struggle for living space and
raw materials in the East. At this point in Hitler's ideology everything fell into place: Marxism was seen as a threat to the voelkische
community because it respected neither political nor ethnic boundaries. 8 It was furthermore an invention and a tool of that "ferment
of decomposition," the Jew, whose sole aim was to subjugate the
Aryan peoples of the world for his own profiteering ends. The
motives for the Jew's actions, however, ran even deeper: "In the
last resort it is the Aryan alone who can form states and set them
on their path to future greatness. All this the Jew cannot do; therefore his revolutions must be international . . . and with his
envious instinct for destruction he seeks to disintegrate the national
spirit of the Germans and pollute their blood." 9 The struggle
against Marxism and the extermination of the Jews, whom Hitler
considered to be the ''biological basis of Bolshevism," 10 became
interwoven with the struggle for living space and protection of the
"Aryan peoples" against a weakening of their racially based strength.
The eventual struggle between these two W eltanschauungen,
National Socialism and Marxism, needed to be translated into
reality: "Therefore an instrument must be created for the voelkische
W eltanschauung, which enables it to fight, just as the Marxist party
organization creates a free path for internationalism." 11 The Pro6. Speech by Adolf Hitler on October 7, 1933 at Bueckeburg, cited in Alan Bullock,
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (compl. rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962),

p. 401.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ibid.
Bullock, Hitler, p. 406.
Speech by Adolf Hitler on July 28, 1922, ibid., p. 407.
Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 498.
Ibid., p. 423.
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gram of the National Socialist German Worker's Party proposed in
Point 22 the creation of a People's Army. 12 This idea, however,
never materialized because of the opposition of the Reischswehr.
Consequently, Hitler, after becoming Chancellor of the Weimar
Republic in 1933 through various manipulations of commanders,
sought to gain control of the Reichswehr, the strongest non-political
institution in the state. After 1941 he intensified his attempts to
make the Wehrmacht the tool of National Socialist ideology. It is
the purpose of this study to trace Hitler's evolving program of
using the military to accomplish his political ends.
12. Das Programm der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei cited in Dr.
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Dr. Werner Jochmann, (eds.), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente zur
Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1945 (Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H.,
1961), n.p.
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CHAPTER

I

The Military Establishment and National
Socialist Ideology
The former President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig,
Hermann Rauschning, once pointed out Adolf Hitler's lack of interest in the details of a problem unless it concerned the Army or
foreign policy. 1 Considering the prominent position of the military
establishment in recent German history, Hitler's concern with military matters would in itself not seem to be out of the ordinary. His
front-line experience as a common soldier in the First World War,
which seems to have been the most formative experience of his life,2
together with his pseudo-Darwinian views of the preeminence of
struggle in the life of a nation, 3 may serve to explain in part his
almost obsessive preoccupation with things military. His activities
as an "Educational Officer" in the immediate postwar period not
only helped him maintain his ties with the Army but also contributed greatly to his extremely negative attitude towards the Weimar
Republic and all it stood for. 4
The picture of the German Army of the First World War as it
emerges from the pages of Mein Kampf stresses the Army's role as
a bulwark against the evils of parliamentarianism and materialism.
The Army is shown as the preserver of the ideals of devoted service
to the country and of the individual's sacrifice for the general welfare of the people. 5 "What many Germans
. did not wish
to see, the alien world around them recognized: The German Army
was the most powerful weapon in the service of the freedom of the
German nation and in the support of the nation's children." 6 The
Army of the future, so Hitler argued, must preserve these traditional
values; in addition it must act as a unifying factor in overcoming
regional sentiments and loyalties. 7 The Army was also to remain
1. Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf
Hitler on His R eal A ims. (London: Thornton and Butterworth Ltd., 1940), p. 183.
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Muenchen: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Franz Eber
Nachf., 1944), p. 225.
3. Speech by Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1929, cited in Dr. Otto Ernst Schueddekopf,
Das H eer und die R epublik: Quellen zur Politik der Reichswehrfuehrung 1918-1988
( Hannover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt 0. Goedel, 1955), p. 281.
4. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 235.
5. Ibid., p. 307.
6. Ibid., p. 308.
7. Ibid., p. 647.
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the "school of the nation" in the coming order, but its educational
role was to be considerably widened. In his discussion of the
voelkische state, Hitler emphasized that one of the tasks of this type
of education was to create in the individual the desire to preserve
his racial purity. The completion of the educational process in the
voelkische state culminates in the military service which "must be
regarded as the conclusion of the average German's normal education." 8 Although Hitler's ideas concerning the nature and role of
the Army in the new state were in 1924 by necessity very general,
they contain the basic elements of his later thoughts and actions:
creation of an essentially political, i.e., National Socialist oriented
Army which, highly centralized and possessed by a spirit of loyalty
and devotion as it had existed in the trenches of the First World
War, would serve as an important factor in the life of the National
Socialist state.
These basic ideas were developed further in a speech by Hitler
in 1929 in which he declared: "Reichswehr or militia, people's army
or standing army or whatever, is for us National Socialists only a
means to an end. Our criterion will forever be: is it useful to our
Volk? Because the Volk is to us a higher concept than the concept
of the state. It is conceivable that a state is rotting and decaying
and that the Volk must destroy such a state because its very life
demands it." 9 At the same occasion Hitler condemned the Reichswehr,s principle of Ueberparteilichkeit 10 and declared it to be the
mission of the Army to "exterminate the vermin of party politics."
He compared the national defense policy of the Social Democratic
Party ( SPD) with the policy of his own movement and stated that
his party, if victorious, would make every effort to create military
formations outlawed by the treaty of Versailles. The most significant statement of the speech, in the light of future developments,
was Hitler's definition of the relationship between the Army and
politics: "To the extent that the political leadership is lacking an
understanding of military leadership, to that extent the military
itself must become the carrier of a political ideology." 11
The creation of a new class of leaders to replace the ruling class
of the past was discussed by Hitler in the summer of 1932 at the
8. Ibid., p. 476.
9. Speech by Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1929, cited in Schueddekopf, Das Heer und
die Republik, p. 281.
10. The term Ueberparteilichkeit denotes the policy of the Reichsweh1' to keep above
politics. This policy goes back to an order by Colonel G en eral Hans von Seeckt, Chief of
the Army Command of the Reichswehr, which was issued following the Kapp Putsch of
March, 1920. See Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 386.
11. Speech by Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1929, cited in Schueddekopf, Das Heer und

die Republik, pp, 283, 286.

Brown House, the headquarters of the National Socialist Party in
Munich. Speaking to a small circle of party comrades, Hitler
explained: "The selection of the new Fuehrer class is my struggle
for power. Whoever proclaims his allegiance to me is by this very
proclamation and by the manner in which it is made one of the
chosen. This is the great revolutionary significance of our long,
dogged struggle for power that in it will be born a new Herren-class
chosen to guide the fortunes not only of the German people, but of
the world." 12 That the leaders of the Army as well as the leaders
of the important organs of the state would have to be included in
this new Fuehrer class seems obvious. The cleavage between the
Reichswehr's concept of "splendid isolation from politics" 13 and
these new concepts was to become increasingly apparent in the
months following Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship of the
German Reich on January 30, 1933.
As Chancellor, Hitler was at last in an official position from
which to influence the policies directly affecting the military establishment. His new position, however, also put him on the horns of
a dilemma. The existence of large, armed formations of Sturmabteilungen (SA) 14 under their aggressive Chief of Staff, Captain
Ernst Roehm, had to be reconciled with the existence of the Reichswehr as the traditionally sole military establishment. On February 3,
1933, Hitler addressed the Commanders of the Army and the Navy
at the occasion of the appointment of the new Reich Defense
Minister, Major General Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg.
Hitler emphasized that the Reichswehr was to remain the sole arms
bearer in Germany and that an amalgamation of Party and Army
formations on the Italian example was out of the question. 15 Hitler's
attitude seems to have been gratefully appreciated by the leaders
of the Armed Forces, especially by von Blomberg and the new Chief
of the Ministeramt in the Defense Ministry, Colonel Walther von
Reichenau. 16 The relationship between the Armed Forces and the
SA was also the subject of Hitler's speech in Bad Godesberg on
August 19, 1933, when he pointed out that the relationship of the
12. Rauscbning, Hitler Speaks, p. 49.
13. Walter Goerlitz, "Wallensteins Lager 1920-1938: Das Verhaeltnis der deutschen
Generalitaet zur Republik und zum Nationalsozialismus," Frankfurter Hefte, No. 5 (May,
1948), 416.
14. The Sturmabteilungen (SA) or Storm Troopers were an irregular National Socialist
Militia.
15. Speech by Adolf Hitler on February 3, 1933, at Berlin to the Commanders of the
Army and Navy cited in Max Domarus, (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 19321945, Vol. I: Triumph (2 vols.; Muenchen: Sueddeutscher Verlag, 1965), 198.
16. Ibid., pp. 197-198, n. 68. The Ministeramt was the office of the Defense Minister
within the Ministry of Defense. Colonel Walther von Reichenau had been Chief of Staff to
von Blomberg in Koenigsberg, East Prussia. Colonel von Reichenau is generally described
as an ardent National Socialist. See Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi
Party 1933-1939 (New York: James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966), p. 30.
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SA to the Army was the same as the relationship between the
political leadership and the Army. Both institutions were not to be
regarded as a purpose in themselves but were to serve only one
purpose, the preservation of the V olk.11
The continuing conflict betwen Roehm's intentions to make the
SA the truly revolutionary army of the movement 18 on one hand
and the Reichswehr's insistence on its position as the sole bearer of
arms in the nation on the other hand began to force Hitler into a
position even more favorable to the Army. In a speech to the
generals of the Reichswehr on February 28, 1934, Hitler not only
confirmed the Reichswehr's desired position but relegated the SA
to political tasks in the interior of the country. 19 Roehm fully
recognized the implications of this shift in Hitler's attitude towards
the SA and accused Hitler of betraying the revolution. 20
Among the reasons for Hitler's siding with the Reichswehr was
the necessity of keeping his obligation to the Reich President Field
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as well as his desire to keep on good
terms with the Reichswehr. 21 Aside from the fact that he was
hardly in a position to quarrel with his new and still powerful
friends in the Defense Ministry, Hitler realized that the future
belonged to an army of professionals. "But the best of these professional troops cannot be selected on the basis of their revolutionary feelings or their status in the party, but solely on their technical
qualifications. I can't seriously be expected to draw the material for
my military elite from the bow-legged and knock-kneed SA." 22 The
former revolutionary, Hitler, who had now become Adolf Legalite,
had to rid himself of the army of street brawlers and terrorists which
had become an organization without a function now that its erstwhile leader had become legitimate.
The probability of the Reich President's impending death provided an impetus for a series of events which culminated in the
disappearance of the SA as an organization of military significance.
17. Speech by Adolf Hitler to the SA and SS L eadership Conference at Bad Godesberg
on August 19, 1933, cited in Domarus, Hitler, I, 293.
18. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, ed. Gordon A. Craig (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 192; Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power,
trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Co., 1944), p. 746.
19. Speech by Adolf Hitler to the Generals of the Reichswehr on February 28, 1934,
cited in Domarus, Hitler, I, 368.
20. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, pp. 154-155. Roehm expressed his disappointment with
Hitler: "Adolf is a swine. He will give us all away. H e only associates with the reactionaries now. His old friends aren't good enough for him. Getting matey with the East
Prussian generals. . . . Are we revolutionaries or aren't w e? . . • I'm the
nucleus of the new army, don't you see that? Don't you understand that what's coming
must be new, fresh and unused? The basis must be revolutionary. You can't inflate it
afterwards. . . . But Hitler puts me off with fair words."
21. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny ( comp!. rev. ed.; N ew York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 268; Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, p. 475.
22. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, p. 185.
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At a meeting in Bad Nauheim on May 16, 1934, the senior officers
of the Ministry of Defense and the Inspectorates of the Army decided to accept Hitler as successor to the Reich President after
von Blomberg told them of an understanding he had reached with
Hitler. According to this understanding, Hitler had promised to
eliminate the SA in return for the Presidency. 23 The exact nature
of this agreement and the circumstances surrounding it seem to be
the matter of some controversy. Alan Bullock, one of Hitler's
biographers, believes that Hitler came to an agreement with the
Reichswehr leaders on that matter during his stay on the cruiser
Deutschland in April, 1934. 24 Some German historians, however,
claim that sufficient evidence for the existence of such an agreement
between Hitler and the Reichswehr generals is lacking. 25 Whatever
the exact nature of that agreement may have been, the Chief of Staff
of the SA and other inconvenient opponents of Hitler's recent policies did find an inglorious end in the Blood Purge of June 30, 1934. 26
It has been pointed out that the Reichswehr played the role of a
pretorian guard during the events of June 30, 1934. 27 Although
Hitler was soon to destroy such pretensions, there were no advanced
indications of this in 1934. Years later, Field Marshal von Blomberg
testified at the Nuremberg Trials that the generals considered much
of what Hitler said as just so much propaganda that need not be
taken seriously. 2 "The personal oath to Hitler [and] the appearance
of the W ehrmacht at the Nuremberg Party Congress in September
[1934], seemed a modest enough price for the apparent restoration
of the military monopoly and the apparent institutional sovereignty
that went with it." 29
The complete satisfaction of the Reichswehr with the outcome of
the purge was summed up in von Blomberg's Order of the Day of
July 1, 1934: "The Fuehrer has personally attacked and destroyed
the traitors and mutineers with exemplary courage and soldierly
decisiveness. The W ehrmacht as the arms bearer of the entire Volk,
aloof from political conflict, will again pledge devotion and fidelity.
Aware of the common ideals, the W ehrmacht will joyfully cultivate
23. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The N emesis of Power: The German Army in Politics
1918-1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 313.
24. Bullock, Hitler, p. 290.
25. H erman Mau and H elmut Krausnick, D eutsche Geschichte der juengsten V ergangenheit 1933-1945 (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag H ermann Leins; Stuttgart: J. B.
Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964), p. 62.
26. Bullock, Hitler, p. 303.
27. Michael Freund, Deutschland unterm Hakenkreuz: Die Geschichte der Jahre 19331945 ( Guetersloh : C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1965), p. 63.
28. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, XL ( 42 vols.; Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal,
1949 ), 406 . (Hereafter cited as IMT.)
29. David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social R evolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany
1933-1939 (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 207.
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cordial relations with the new SA." 30 Even the Reich President felt
that he had to congratulate the Prussian Minister President and now
General of the Infantry, Hermann Goering, on his success in "defeating the attempt to commit treason." 31 The rewards for the Reichswehr's silence of complicity were soon to come. In his Reichstag
Speech of July 13, 1934, Hitler reminded the Reichswehr that he
had argued for fourteen years that the fighting organizations of the
Party had nothing to do with the Army, that he had clearly stood
by his original position and that "there is only one bearer of the
arms in the state: the W ehrmacht. And there is only one source of
the political will: the National Socialist Party." 32
The entire affair of mutual reassurances of trust and devotion
was not without overtures from the Army. On the day before the
purge of the SA, von Blomberg had elaborated on the position of the
W ehrmacht in the Third Reich in an article in the official Party
organ, the V oelkischer Beobachter. He explained that the Army
would serve the new state and its leadership from deepest conviction and assured his readers of the loyalty of the Army to the
President and to the Fuehrer, "who once came from our ranks and
will always remain one of us." 33
At the time of the death of the Reich President on August 2, 1934,
the small number of opponents to Hitler's presidential ambitions
were divided among themselves and without influence on the course
of events. 34 Hitler's Cabinet had acted with speed, and on the
night before the President's death, it had decreed the "Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich" which unified the
office of Reich President with that of the Chancellor. The law was
to become effective at the moment of the old President's death. 35
This act allowed Hitler to unite in his person the offices of President
of the Reich, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Chancellor
of the Reich, and Fuehrer of the National Socialist Party. This
is not to say, however, that Hitler was now in full command
of the Armed Forces. Technically all orders of the President concerning the military establishment had to be countersigned by
either the Chancellor or, as was customary, the Defense Minister. 36
30. Decree of July 1, 1934, by the Reich Defense Minister, cited in Domarus, Hitler, 1,
405.
31. Telegram from the Reich President to Hermann Goering, date July 2, 1934, cited in
ibid.
32. Speech by Adolf Hitler to the German Reichstag on July 13, 1934, cited in ibid.,
p. 417.
33. Voelkischer Beobachter, June 29, 1934, ibid., 393.
34. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, p. 331.
35. "Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich" of August 1, 1934,
cited in Domarus, Hitler, I, 429.
36. Friedrich Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934-1938 (2d ed. rev.;
Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), p. 54.

With the compliant von Blomberg heading the Defense Ministry
there would have been no obstacle to Hitler's exercise of full control
over the Armed Forces, but Hitler appears to have been aware of
the fact that von Blomberg was not representative of the entire
Army leadership. Never one to force things at an inopportune
moment, Hitler wisely kept himself in the background and, for
the time being, appears to have been content to exercise his powers
as Supreme Commander only nominally. 87
The significance of the fusion of the office of Reich President
with that of Reich Chancellor lay in the fact that it opened the way
to one-man rule. It had enabled Hitler to become Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in a quasi-legitimate fashion. 88 This
fact was duly emphasized by von Blomberg's order of August 2,
1934, to the troops to take a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler. 89
The text of this fateful oath deviated from the wording of the past
oath in that it established a personal tie of loyalty between the
officers and men of the W ehrmacht and Hitler rather than a pledge
of loyalty to the country or the government. 40 Hitler's reply to what
appears to have been a voluntary action on von Blomberg's part
made the meaning of the oath even clearer, and, whether intentionally or not, reminded the Army leaders that an old bargain had
been fulfilled. "Just as the officers and soldiers of the W ehrmacht
have pledged themselves to the new state in my person, so will I at
all times regard it as my highest duty to intercede in behalf of the
in accordance
stability and inviolability of the W ehrmacht
with my own desire to fix ( verankern) the army as the sole bearer
of arms ( einziger W affentraeger) in the nation." 41
Although Hitler abstained from direct interference in internal
Army matters for the time being, he began to consolidate his position as Supreme Commander through a series of legislative acts.
The W ehrgesetz of May 21, 1935, gave to the Reich War Minister
the additional title of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
and to Hitler the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
The law provided that the Reich War Minister exercise his func37. Ibid., p. 64.
38. Michael Freund argues that the appoinbnent of Hitler was in direct violation of the
Enabling Law which provided that the government could change the constitution but could
not abolish the office of Reich President. Freund, Deutschland unterm Hakenkreuz, p. 63.
39. Rossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, p. 65.
40. The text of the oath reads: "I swear by God this holy oath that I will render to
Adolf Hitler, Leader of the German nation and people, Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, unconditional obedience, and I am ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any
time for this oath." Cited in O'Neill, The German Anny and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939,
p. 55.

Freund argues that the oath was invalid because the Cabinet legalized it after the
soldiers had taken it. In addition, the soldiers were already under oath to the constitution.
Freund, Deutschland unterm Hakenkreuz, p. 71.
41. Letter by Hitler to von Blomberg, date August 20, 1934, cited in Craig, The
Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 480.
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tions under the direction of the Supreme Commander and contained
no provision that orders by the Supreme Commander required
the countersignature of either the War Minister or the Chancellor. 42
While the leadership of the Armed Forces were kept busy implementing the new laws regulating conscription and military, service,43
Hitler made plain to the nation at large and to those in the Armed
Forces who wanted to know what were the legal technicalities of
the new W ehrgesetz and the new oath. "The two pillars of the new
Reich may keep in mind that only acting as one can they fulfill their
tasks. The Party gives the Army to the Volk, and the Volk gives
the soldiers to the Army; both jointly give to the German Reich the
security of inner peace and the strength for maintaining its position." 44
On the newly established "Day of the W ehrmacht," Hitler drew
a line of distinction between the old Reichswehr and the new
W ehrmacht. In his "Speech to the Soldiers" he referred to the
assembled troops as the "new soldiers of the new German Reich." 45
A few weeks later the new soldiers were told in the Order of the
Day of November 7, 1935, that the swastika which now decorated
the new war flag should be to them "the symbol of unity and purity
of the nation, signifying the strength of the National Socialist
W eltanschauung." 46 There were neither protests nor actions by
the leaders of the Armed Forces against this continuing injection
of political slogans, symbols, and ideas into the military system.
Any opposition of Army leaders against the regime would have
been opposition against the legitimately constituted authority of the
state to which officers and men were bound by a personal oath of
loyalty.
A series of internal events, such as the Fritsch Crisis, brought in
their wake a further drastic change in the relationship between
Hitler and the Army. The chain of intrigues, scandals, and accusations affected the entire higher command structure of the Armed
Forces and found its final expression in Hitler's "Decree Concerning
the Leadership of the Armed Forces" in which Hitler announced
that he would now exercise the power of command over the Armed
Forces "directly and personally." The Decree also announced the
42. Weh1'gesetz, May 21 1935, cited in Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Dr. Werner
Jocbmann (eds.), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente ZU1' Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 19331945 (Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H., 1961 ), n. p. The Weh1'gesetz designated
von Blomberg as Reich War Minister rather than Reich Defense Minister.
43. Conscription had been introduced by the Gesetz fue1' den Aufbau der W eh1'macht
of March 16, 1935, ibid., n. p.
44. "Final Speech" by Hitler to the Party Congress at Nuremberg in September, 1935,
cited in Domarus, Hitle1', I, 541.
45. "Speech to the Soldiers" by Hitler on September 16, 1935, at Nuremberg, ibid.,
539.
46. Order of the Day of November 7, 1935, by Hitler, ibid., 549.
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creation of a High Command of the Armed Forces ( Oberkommando
der W ehrmacht or OKW) which was to operate directly under
Hitler's command as his military staH. 47 At the same time, Colonel
General Baron Werner Thomas Ludwig von Fritsch and Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg received Hitler's letters of appreciation
for past services in which the Fuehrer expressed his desire that their
health might soon improve. 48 In rapid succession, on the same day,
a series of military appointments was announced, the most important of which made Colonel General Herman Goering a Field
Marshal, General Walther von Brauchitsch Commander in Chief of
the Army, and General Wilhelm Keitel Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces. 49
47. Erlass ueber die Fuehrung der Wehrmacht of February 4, 1938, by Hitler, cited in
Domarus, Hitler, I , 782.
48. Letters by Hitler to von Blomberg and von Fritsch, date February 4, 1938, ibid.,
783. Von Fritsch was relieved of his duties as Commander in Chief of the Army because
of his supposed involvement with a homosexual ex-convict. Von Blomberg was relieved of
his duties because of his marriage to a lady with a questionable background. See WheelerBennett, The N emesis of Power, p. 367.
49. Letter of appointment of Wilhelm Keitel by Hitler, date February 4, 1938, cited
in Domarus, Hitler, I, 783.
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CHAPTER

II

Military Tradition in the Inter-War Period
"It was a point of honor with the Prussian officer to be correct, it

is a duty of the German officer to be crafty." 1 This statement by

von Blomberg expressed not only the tragic deterioration of the
traditional concept of honor but also characterized very well the
narrow class outlook of that older generation of officers whose
prime concern in their relationship with the state was to serve the
interests of the Army. Craftiness, however, was not the answer to
the problems which confronted the senior officers after 1933.
To some extent these problems had been caused by the numerical
increase of officers in the new W ehrmacht. Whereas the old
100,000-man Reichswehr had listed 4,000 officers, the Army in 1939
listed a total of 24,000 officers. 2 The older generation of officers
viewed the new arrivals with a great deal of misgiving and suspicion. 3 They were, after all, not the product of von Seeckt's school of
thought 4 but, in many cases, the products of previous schooling in
the Hitler Youth, the SA, or the Reich Labor Service. 5 The older
officers had seen the purpose of the 100,000-man Army as a vessel
in which to transmit the traditional values of the soldier's profession
and had favored an organic growth based on these values. The
newcomers had little or no understanding of these values and were
much more impressed with the modern and aggressive spirit of the
National Socialist movement. 6 To what extent the former members
of the Free Corps found a place in the new Army has not been
established. Their contribution to the Army seems to have been
indirect: many of them rose to positions of power in the National
Socialist state from where they were able to pass on to the new
generation their "brutality of spirit and exaltation of power." 7
Aside from the numerical increase and the resulting inability of
the senior officers to weld the Corps into a homogeneous and cohe1. Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg quoted in Hermann Rauscbning, The R evolution
of Nihilism: Warning to the West (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939), p. 123.
2. Hermann Foertsch, Schuld und V erhaengnis: Die Fritsch-Krise im Fruehfahr 1938 als
W endepunkt in der Ge chichte der nationalsozialistischen Z eit ( Stuttgart: D eutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1951), p. 106.
3. Peter Bor, G espraeche mit Halder (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950), p. 106.
4. See Chapter I , n. 10.
5. Foertsch, Schuld und V erhaengnis, p. 181.
6. Bor, G espraeche mit Halder, p. 107.
7. Robert G. Waite, Van~uard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movem ent in Post War
Germany 1918-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 281.
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sive unit, 8 another and much more profound problem confronted
the older generation. The traditional concept of honor in the
Prussian Army had always been tied to the monarch. 9 But with the
disappearance of the monarchy, a void was created. "In the absence
of spiritual directives," a former Prussian officer wrote in 1939, "from
which the officers are suffering at the moment, with their two elements of guidance, the Crown and the Christian Church taken
from them, they are reduced to spiritual Ersatz, cheap substitutes
of doubtful origin and efficacy." 10 While the experience of the First
World War had already contributed to a heightening of the moral
value of absolute obedience, 11 this process not only continued but
was considerably strengthened during the Seeckt era. 12 In 1923
von Seeckt declared: "A soldier's honor does not lie in knowing
better or having better ideas, but in obeying." 13 The disastrous
consequences of this attitude became clear at Nuremberg in 1945
when General Colonel Alfred Jodl said: "I have been an obedient
soldier and I saw my honor in keeping that obedience which I had
sworn.
. . I have in these five years worked and I have remained silent, although I often held a different opinion, and recognized that impossible nonsense which I was ordered to perform." 14
As absolute obedience became a moral absolute, and as such the
basis of an officer's honor, the oath of loyalty now sworn to the
person of the Fuehrer was soon to create a dilemma which many
of the older officers were unable to resolve. Some attempted to
resign, others took Hight into professionalism and talked about the
traditional Ueberparteilichkeit of the Army, but the overwhelming
majority thought that they had to continue to serve the state. After
the end of the Second World War, von Blomberg reflected: "I have
never been aware of an action or an opposition of the generals
against Hitler and his National Socialist Program. Through his
program of rearmament he brought the generals the fulfillment of
old desires. During my ministry Hitler attempted to stand by the
traditions of the soldiers in every respect. If so many generals now
deny their attitudes towards Hitler during these years, memory
must have played a trick on them." 15
8. Rauscbning, Revolution of Nihilism, p. 152.
9. Karl Demeter, Das Deutsche O{fizierkorps in Gesellsschaft und Staat 1650-1945 ( 4th
ed. rev. and expanded; Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer Wehrwesen,
1965), p. 151.
10. Rauschning, Revolution of Nihilism, p. 152.
11. Demeter, Das Deutsche O{fizierskorps, p. 147.
12. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, ed. Gordon A. Craig (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 167.
13. Demeter, Das Deutsche Offizierskorps, p. 148.
14. Ibid., p. 151.
15. Foertsch, Schuld und Verhaengnis, p. 182.
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The lack of concern over the political ideology of the Nazi movement and the narrow class interests of the older members of the
corps of officers were to a great degree the result of the Corps'
traditional relationship in the state. Like the concept of honor, the
relationship of the officers to the state had traditionally been characterized by the link between monarch and officer. As such the Corps'
responsibility lay neither with the people nor with the state but
rather with its source of existence, the crown. 16 Under the Weimar
Republic and von Seeckt's guidance, the majority of officers felt
little allegiance to either the Republic or the Constitution.17 Their
allegiance lay rather with a somewhat nebulous concept, a kind
of "permanent state" which according to von Seeckt was represented by the Army. 18 General Wilhelm Groener, Reichwehrminister from 1928 to 1932, defined the functions of the Army in
1930 in these words: "It is the sacred task of the W ehrmacht to
prevent the cleavage between classes and parties from ever widening into suicidal civil war. In all times of need . . . there is
one unshakable rock in the stormy sea: the idea of the state. The
W ehrmacht is its necessary and most characteristic expression. It
has no other interest and no other task than service to the state.
[The Wehrmacht] would falsify its essence and destroy
itself if it descended into the party conflict and itself took party." 19
Although Ueberparteilichkeit served the nation well during times
of crises, it also had serious drawbacks: not only was the Army
"above parties," it also was above identifying itself with the Republic, with parliament, or with the Constitution. 20 In short, the Army
existed outside the political reality of the Weimar Republic and
attempted to function in a world of its own, guided by vague
concepts of a by-gone era.
Dr. Julius Leber ( SPD ), one of the parliamentary specialists on
W ehrmacht questions, recognized this problem as early as 1931
when he pointed out that obedience was not enough and that the
soldier "must have a mental image of what his task consists of" and
should recognize a set of ideals which he could follow. 21 Many of
the younger officers had already found such ideals in the new
revolutionary movement of the National Socialists. Thus the real
significance of the Ulm treason trials in 1930, involving Reichswehr
officers with National Socialist leanings, was that they brought to
16.
17.
Oxford
18.
19.
20.
21.

Demeter, Das Deutsche Otfizierskorps, p. 182.
Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York:
University Press, 1964), p. 426.
Ibid., pp. 388-389.
Decree of the Reichswehr Ministry of January 22, 1930, cited in ibid., p. 433.
Demeter, Das Deutsche Offizierkorps, p. 190.
Ibid., p. 191.
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the open for the first time that rift in the Corps of Officers which
separated the old generation of officers from the young not only in
terms of their background and previous service but, most important
of all, in terms of the ideals to which they adhered. 22 General
von Seeckt's thesis of the all-importance of discipline and obedience
to authority had obviously proven to be insufficient motivation for
the defendants and their sympathizers. The counsel for the defense
at the Ulm treason trials asked the poignant question: "How is
the soldier expected to sacrifice his life for people who say they
know no fatherland called Germany?" He continued his argument
adding that the soldier must put his country above the Constitution
when the provisions of the Constitution are executed by traitors
who are not cultivating a spirit of national defense. 23
Although it appears that this type of attitude was not confined
to junior officers only, the extent to which general officers subscribed
to it is difficult to determine. General Walther Reinhardt observed
that two thirds of the young Reichswehr officers realized, as he did,
that there was a pressing need for new ideals in the Army because
whatever the Republic had to offer in that respect was meaningless
to most of the officers. 24 General Hans Oster wrote in 1944 that
most of the officers looked upon the events of 1933-1934 as a return
to earlier traditions and, for that reason alone, welcomed National
Socialism. They did not understand, he added, what was meant by
phrases like "synthesis of party and state"; what was foremost in
their minds was the rebuilding of the Army into a truly patriotic
instrument. 25 This attitude was apparently characteristic of a number of the senior officers. Their attitude towards the National
Socialist state was primarily determined by their interests as a
professional class rather than by sympathy for the entire National
Socialist program. Their traditional aversion to politics and their
exaggerated concept of loyalty and obedience were to prove invaluable assets for a political manipulator of Hitler's skill.
The junior officers, however, who had gone through training in
the Hitler Youth or the Reich Labor Service were to provide an
22. The d efendants were Lieutenant Richard Scheringer and Lieutenant Hans Ludin.
Their ultimate objective was to gain the support of the Officer Corps in the event of a Nazi
Revolution. They were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig on October 4, 1930, to eighteen months of fortress detention for conspiracy to commit high treason.
See John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 19181945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 214-220 passim.
23. Dr. Sack, "Das Ringen fuer Blut und Ehre," Vo elkischer Beobachter, October 10,
1930, cited in Dr. Otto Ernst Schueddekopf, Das H eer und die R epublik: Quellen zur
Politik der Reichswehrfuehrung 1918-1933 (Hanover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt 0.
Goedel, 1955), p. 269.
24. Ibid.
25. Demeter, Das Deutsche Oflizierskorps, pp. 326-327.
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ever increasing percentage of Nazi sympathizers within the Armed
Forces. 26 Thus the German Officer Corps by 1938 was no longer
a homogeneous unit as in the era of von Seeckt. Internally divided
and lacking a truly unifying philosophy, the Corps presented a
picture not unlike the Weimar Republic, which it so detested.
26. Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party 1933-1939 (New York:
James H. H eineman, Inc., 1966), p. 95.
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CHAPTER

III

The Rise of General Keitel and the OKW
Wilhelm Keitel was born on September 22, 1882, in Helmscherode, where he spent his early life at his father's farm. He attended
secondary school at Goettingen and, during his senior year, toyed
with the idea of taking a commission in the Field Artillery, simply
because "they had horses." His father's second marriage prevented
Keitel's return to the farm: financial problems and the size of the
farm made it impossible to sustain two families. 1 On March 7, 1901,
he entered the Lower Saxon Field Artillery Regiment No. 42. 2 In
August, 1914, when World War I began, Keitel, now a Lieutenant
with the Wolfenbuetteler Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the
Belgian border with his troops. 3 He served for a time as battery
commander, was promoted to Captain, and in March, 1915, was
assigned to a General Staff position with the X Reserve Corps. 4 His
letters to his wife and to his father during that period expressed his
pride over the last appointment but also his inadequate preparation
for the task. 5
Like most other officers, he was shocked by the outbreak of the
revolution in Germany in 1918: "Those of us who have known
discipline and order as the symbols of a German soldier's virtue
. I think that we will be
have had a terrible experience.
able to create a viable state through the National Assembly and
that we shall be able to overcome gradually the consequences of
the revolution and the wretched war. Both could have been avoided
anyhow." 6
After the war Keitel continued his service with the Reichswehr
in various command positions. On February 1, 1925, he was transferred to General Staff Service in the Armed Forces Office, Depart1. Walter Goerlitz ( ed.), Generalfeldmanchall Keitel: V erbrecher oder Of]izier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW ( Goettingen: Musterscbmidt Verlag, 1961),
p. 13.
2. Ibid. , p. 14; Douglas M. Kelly, Prison Psychiatrist at Nuremberg, and G. M. Gilbert,
Prison Psychologist at Nuremberg, respectively referred to Keitel as "a traditional Prussian
gentleman" and the "chief representative of Prussian militarism." See Douglas M. Kelley,
M. D., 22 Cells in Nuremberg (New York: MacFadden Publications, Inc., 1961 ), p. 94;
G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1961 ), p. 29.
3. Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 19.
4. Postcard from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, March 11, 1915, ibid., p. 29.
5. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to bis father, July 13, 1915, ibid., p. 32.
6. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father-in-law, D ecember 10, 1918, ibid., p. 36.
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ment of Army Organization. 7 Although his letters during that time
were mostly concerned with his work, they contained some political
sentiment: the writer blamed the Social Democratic Party for the
financial restrictions under which the Reichswehr operated, 8 and,
jealous of the prerogatives of the Army, he wrote of the "presumptuous attitude of the SA." 9 Taken as a whole, however, his correspondence between the end of World War I and Hitler's chancellorship gave no hint of any interest in the National Socialist movement. The image of Keitel reflected in these letters was that of an
extremely conscientious and hard-working bureaucrat. 10
In November, 1931, two years after he had become head of the
Organizations Department in the Armed Forces Office, Keitel was
promoted to Colonel. 11 Between 1933 and 1934 he served as Infantry Commander in Potsdam. During that time he had several
clashes with the local SA leader, Obergruppenfuehrer Otto Ernst,
whom he suspected of meddling in Reichswehr affairs. After a
short period of service in Bremen, he was appointed successor to
General Walther von Reichenau, the head of the Armed Forces
Office. In his memoirs Keitel emphasized that it was von Fritsch
who suggested him for that position, ostensibly to show that von
Fritsch considered him to be a traditional soldier in contrast to the
well-known National Socialist Reichenau. Although Keitel said that
he was happy as Divisional Commander in Bremen and that he
wanted to have nothing to do with politics, he agreed to take the
new position, "because I was a bit vain and it [the appointment]
was an obvious recognition of my abilities and the confidence placed
in me." In 1945 Keitel wrote that when Hitler came to power, he
thought of him as being a good "drummer," i.e., a man who had
been successful influencing the masses of the people. "After all
. we were used to changes in the government," he said. 12
That he was not particularly bothered by some of the methods the
Nazis used to come to power was not out of the ordinary for a
member of his profession.
It should also be noted that Hitler's program contained promises
to the Reichswehr which no patriotic officer could afford to reject
without being called a traitor to his class. Former Vice-Admiral
Kurt Assma~ recalled later, "The officers viewed with genuine
satisfaction Hitler's new program of freeing the Wehrmacht from
7. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, January 1, 1925, ibid., p. 39.
8. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, September 5, 1931, ibid., p. 47.
9. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, August 28, 1932, ibid., p. 51.
10. Letter from Lisa Keitel to father-in-law, January 23, 1926, ibid., p. 40.
11. Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party 1933-1939 (New York:
James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966), Appendix B, p. 193.
12. "Memoirs 1933-1938," Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 58-80, 79, n. 84.
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the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles and making it once again a
power corresponding to the greatness of the Reich." If, from the
viewpoint of a quarter century later, the officers' lack of resistance
to Hitler was decried as default of character, one must also recall
that the Reichswehr had for years been taught to follow von Seeckt's
principle of Ueberparteilichkeit as well as his idea that it was the
function of the Army to provide the strongest support for the
government in power. 13
The degree to which Keitel was an adherent of this kind of thinking was evident in his reflection on the Roehm Purge. He had been
suspicious of the SA since his days at Potsdam and apparently
believed, then and at Nuremberg, that Roehm intended to eliminate
von Blomberg and von Fritsch. He regretted that General Kurt von
Schleicher and Major General Kurt von Bredow had been murdered
by an SA squad during the Roehm Purge; they should have been
court-martialled, he said, because of their involvement in politics
which were in opposition to the government in power. "General von
Schleicher," Keitel wrote in 1945, "was unfortunately involved in
this game; he was and remained the cat which could not resist
catching political mice." 14 To Keitel the entire Roehm affair was
simply a matter of the legitimate government maintaining itself
against a band of revolutionaries. His position, like that of the
Reichswehr, was clear: support the legitimate government against
disorder. There is no evidence that ideological considerations
played a role in Keitel's position.
The political and military development in the first five years of
Hitler's chancellorship had little effect on the structure of the
Armed Forces leadership. The ascendancy of the already existing
High Command of the Armed Forces ( Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) on February 4, 1938, to the position which it heldat least in theory-until the end of the war was in part made possible by the dismissal of the Reich War Minister and Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces General Field Marshal von Blomberg.
From now on [read the Fuehrer's decree of February 4, 1938], I exercise the
immediate command over the whole armed forces. The former Wehrmacht
Office in the War Ministry becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces
[OKW], and comes immediately under my command as my military staff. At
the head of the Staff of the High Command stands the former Chief of the
Wehrmacht Office [Keitel]. He is accorded the rank equivalent to that of Reich
Minister. The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the functions of the War Ministry, and the Chief of the High Command exercises, as
13. Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann, "Hitler and the German Officer Corps," trans.
Captain Roland E. Krause. United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, LXXX (May,
1956), 510.
14. Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 70-71.
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my deputy, the power hitherto held by the Reich War Minister. The task of
preparing the unified defense of the Reich in all fields in accordance with my
instructions is the function of the High Command in times of peace.15

The ambiguous wording of the decree, which in one place defines
the OKW as "my military staff'' but in another place assigns to it the
role of the former War Ministry, raises the important question of
how much independence of action the OKW was to possess and
consequently to what degree it was to be responsible for orders
issued in its name. In a conversation with the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers, Hitler explained: "In
the future I do not want a Reich War Minister nor do I want a
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces who stands between
myself and the Commanders in Chief of the Services." 16 The text
of the Fuehrer Decree as well as Keitel's later testimony at Nuremberg indicates that the position of Reich War Minister was in fact
abolished.17 The administrative functions of the Ministry were
from now on handled by the OKW, whereas the command functions
connected with the office of Reich War Minister in the latter's
capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces were taken
over by Hitler. 18
Although the decree of February 4, 1938, defined the function of
the OKW as a military staff of the Supreme Commander, it did
not define the function of the staff, i.e., it did not explain whether
the OKW was to be an advisory body to the Supreme Commander
or whether it was to be a type of General Staff of the Armed Forces.
When Hitler was confronted with this question, he gave an evasive
answer, saying that at the "appropriate time" he would see no
obstacle to a General Staff of the Armed Forces. 19 The possibility
of creating an Armed Forces General Staff had in fact been a
matter of some controversy among the leadership of the Armed
Forces since 1933. 20
When von Blomberg decided in 1935 that his title "Reich Minister
for War and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht" necessitated
the creation of a High Command for the purpose of unifying the
15. Erlass ueber die Fuehrung der W ehrmacht of February 4, 1938, by Hitler, cited in
Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, Vol. I: Triumph ( 2 vols.; Muenchen: Sueddeutscher Verlag, 1965), 782. Beginning in February, 1934, the Ministeramt
in the Defense Ministry was designated Wehrmachtamt or Armed Forces Office. In cases
where this office r epresented the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces it used the title
OKW. See Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's H eadquarters 1939-1945, trans. R. H. Barry
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 588.
16. Testimony of Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers on April 8, 1946, IMT, XI, 29.
17. Deposition by Wilhelm Keitel on August 15, 1945, (Nelte File), cited in Goerlitz,
Keitel, pp. 312-322.
18. John W. Wheeler-Bennett's contention that Hitler assumed the functions of War
Minister is misleading. See Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in
Politics 1918-1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 373.
19. "Memoirs 1933-1938," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 113.
20. O'Neill, The German Army, p. 108.
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three branches of the Armed Forces along the lines of the Reich's
centralized system of government, the Commanders in Chief of
the Services, especially of the Army, soon expressed their opposition
to his plans. 21 As early as 1934 von Blomberg had begun to expand
the M inisteramt in the Defense Ministry by adding an Operational
Defense Staff. This development seemed to point towards a situation in which the Commanders in Chief of the Services not only
would be removed to a lower level in the military hierarchy but
would also have to give up part of their independent authority to
von Blomberg's Ministeramt. The opponents in the struggle between the Armed Forces Office ( the former Ministeramt) and the
General Staff of the Army were Major General Walther von Reichenau and General Ludwig Beck respectively. After von Reichenau's
transfer to the command of W ehrkreis VII, in August, 1935, Major
General Keitel took his place. 22
In August, 1937, von Fritsch presented von Blomberg with a
lengthy memorandum in which he explained his views on the command structure of the Armed Forces. Although he recognized the
need for a unified High Command of the Armed Forces, he rejected
the notion that such an agency should be based upon the idea of
equal importance of the three services. He argued that any
organization of the High Command would have to consider the
primacy of the Army in view of its greater numerical strength and
its greater tactical significance in a European land war. It was for
that reason unthinkable to him to interpolate an inter-service staff
with coordinating functions between the Army High Command
and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. His major
objection to a creation of an Armed Forces High Command was
that such an agency would tend to mushroom into a huge bureaucracy, thus removing the influence of Army commanders from the
overall direction of the war effort. The solution von Fritsch offered
in his memorandum was to leave the entire power of command
with the Reich War Minister and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. To bring about the necessary coordination between
the Services, von Fritsch simply suggested that the High Command
of the Army be entrusted with planning and working out the proposals for the overall conduct of the military operations. 23 This
solution would have given the Army General Staff the decisive voice
in the planning and conduct of war. Blomberg's proposed reorganization, on the other hand, tended to concentrate planning and
21. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 7.
22. O'Neill, The German Army, p. 108.
23. Memorandum of Colonel General von Fritsch, "Wehrmachtspitzengliederung und
Fuehrung der Wehrmacht im Kriege," August, 1937, cited in Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 123-144.
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strategy at a level which was considerably closer to the political
arena than the General Staff of the Army.
According to Keitel, who maintained good personal relations with
von Fritsch, 24 the Commander in Chief of the Army insisted that the
Army remain "above politics," since he considered National Socialism a temporary political stage and secretly nurtured dreams of a
restoration of the Hohenzollern monarchy; he had welcomed Hitler
as Chancellor to destroy the parties of the Weimar Republic but
rejected him as Head of State. 25 Von Blomberg, on the other hand,
was of the opinion that the Armed Forces needed to accept the
National Socialist ideology as the basis of the new state just as they
had accepted the idea of the monarchy under the last emperor.
"He [von Blomberg] saw in National Socialism and the Fuehrer
idea a type of elective monarchy instead of the inherited monarchy." 26 The difference of opinion between those favoring the
eventual creation of an all-embracing Armed Forces General Staff
and those favoring von Fritsch's solution appears to have created
another division within the senior officers-"revolutionary Nazi upstarts on one side and the Army traditionalists on the other," as
one conservative observer put it after the war. 27
However, Hitler's assumption of direct command over the Armed
Forces officially eliminated the intermediary level, meaning von
Blomberg and his OKW. A High Command reappeared in its place
but now as Hitler's military staff. The ambiguity of Hitler's position
at the time made it difficult to tell whether this new OKW was to
follow the course charted for it by von Blomberg or whether it had
in fact become something entirely new.
Shortly after the official announcement of the formation of the
new OKW, Keitel prepared a Position Paper in which he outlined
his concept of the higher organization of the W ehrmacht. He
argued that the demands of the total war of the future necessitated
a coordination of the nation's entire resources and potentialities
with the purpose of incorporating them into the overall planning
of the war. This total coordination, Keitel argued, could not possibly be handled by the Supreme Commander alone but must be
administered by the OKW. He admitted that the Army could
well be the decisive factor in a land war but added that the relative
importance of the three Services was by no means fixed. Keitel
appealed to the Services to consider themselvs a part of the entire
24.
25.
26.
27.
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"Memoirs 1933-1938," ibid., p. 86.
lbi.d., pp. 86-87.
Ibi.d. , p. 86.
Warlimont, Inside Hitler's H eadquarters, p. 9.

armed force of the nation and to surrender a part of their traditional
independence of action so that unity in organization as well as in
leadership would be guaranteed. 28
Keitel explained later that it had been his intention to separate
the command functions from the administrative functions within
the existing structure at the top level of the Armed Forces. The
purpose of this separation would have been to provide the Commander in Chief in his capacity as the highest ranking officer with
an OKW and in his capacity as Reich War Minister with a type
of ministerial office. Keitel envisioned his own position as that of
the Minister's Secretary. 29
Keitel's Position Paper of April 19, 1938, indicated that his thinking on the new OKW was guided solely by the desire to bring
about a greater degree of efficiency in the organization of the
Armed Forces. "It is contrary to the principles of total war of the
future," he wrote, "to believe that the task of conducting the actual
war, the coordination of economic and propaganda warfare, and
the organization of the entire nation for the support of the war can
be separated. They have to be very closely united, not only in the
person of the Generalissimus [ Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces] who would only be a shadow leader like the emperor
. but in a staff-the High Command of the Armed Forces." 30
Keitel envisioned the organization of the Armed Forces leadership
in times of war as follows: the political leadership and the leadership of the nation as a whole to be the task of the Fuehrer; the
conduct of the actual warfare, the coordination of propaganda and
economic measures with the goals of military operations to be the
task of the Generalissimus in accordance with directions received
by the Fuehrer. 31
The contention that the "creation of the OKW under Keitel was
a powerful means of transferring the strategic direction of German
policy from the hands of the Army to those of Hitler, by default of
character on the part of Keitel" 32 seems to ignore the fact that
Keitel's proposed organization clearly provided for a separation of
the functions of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces from
that of the Fuehrer. Keitel apparently did not realize at that time
that Hitler never intended to fill the position of Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces and that Hitler's solution constituted an amal28. Position Paper by the Chief of the OKW, "Die Kriegsfuehrung als Problem der
Organization," April 19, 1938, cited in Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 154-164.
29. "Memoirs 1933-1938," ibid., p. 98.
30. Position Paper by the Chief of the OKW, "Die Kriegsfuehrung als Problem der
Organisation," April 19, 1938, ibid., p. 155.
31. Ibid., p. 154.
32. O'Neill, The German Army, p. 117.
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gamation of the political and military leadership. All that remained
of Keitel's plan of organization was the hope that the unified command of three Services had been institutionalized in the OKW. 33
The circumstances surrounding Keitel's appointment as head of
this ill-defined organization have been the subject of some disagreement. It has been argued that Keitel had in fact worked
towards achieving this position for himself. A closer examination of
Keitel's appointment, however, shows that he neither wanted the
position nor knew what it entailed after he had accepted it. In fact,
he does not seem to have become aware of the impending removal
of von Blomberg until January 26, 1938. It was in the course of a
conversation on that date that von Blomberg told Keitel to report
to Hitler on that afternoon. At five o'clock Keitel presented himself
to Hitler, whom he had personally never met before. Hitler indicated to Keitel that he was deeply hurt by the entire Blomberg
affair but that he had, nevertheless, given the new couple a trip
around the world. He then brought up the question of a successor
to von Blomberg; Keitel mentioned Hermann Goering. After Hitler
rejected that proposal, Keitel suggested von Fritsch. At this point
Hitler informed Keitel of the pending charges against the Colonel
General. Shocked by the distressing news, Keitel continued to
make suggestions: Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt was rejected because of his advanced age, General Walther von Brauchitsch was discussed but nothing was decided. Keitel was ordered
to report again on the following day. 34
When Keitel met Hitler on January 27, Hitler seemed extremely
upset. He informed Keitel of the latest developments in the Fritsch
affair and fulminated against his adjutant, Colonel Friedrich Rossbach, who had informed Fritsch of the charges against him. When
Keitel again suggested Goering as successor to von Blomberg,
Hitler suddenly told him that he had decided to take personal
command of the Armed Forces and that he had chosen him, Keitel,
to be his Chief of Staff; Keitel agreed "without hesitation." 35 That
the turbulent events of the last days of January must have greatly
disturbed Keitel is shown in the entries in General Jodl's diary.
After his first meeting with Hitler, Keitel came to Jodl "deeply
shaken with tears in his eyes about the tremendous blow dealt to
our joint task. I say to him: even if the man [Blomberg] should
33. By June, 1938, the OKW consisted of four major departments: an Armed Forces
Operations Office or W ehrmachtfuehrungsamt, a Foreign and Counter Intelligence Office or
Amt Ausland/ Abwehr, a General Armed Forces Office or Amtsgruppe Allgemeine Wehrmachtsangelegenheiten, and a Military Economics Group or Wirtscha~s und Ruestungsamt.
See H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. xviii.
34. Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 87, n. 117, 106-109.
35. Ibid., p. 109.

fall, his work must remain alive." The entries of January 27 indicate
not only the type of emotional pressure which Hitler brought to
bear on Keitel but also the very close identification which Keitel and
Jodi felt with the organizational accomplishments of von Blomberg:
"He [Hitler] says to Keitel, I am now relying on you, you must
stay with me. You are my confidant and only adviser in military
questions. The unified leadership is sacrosanct and invoilable
to me. . . . General Keitel says to me: the unity of the
W ehrmacht is secured." During that conversation Hitler also complained to Keitel about his growing loneliness and his disappointments. Jodi concluded his observations of the meeting that day
with the comment: "It was a tragic and deeply shocking moment
. but all shadows are overcome by the certainty: the work
of the First Fieldmarshal of the Third Reich, the unity of the
W ehrmacht and its leadership, lives and if a kind fate stays with us
won't be destroyed again." 36 From his jail cell in Nuremberg in
1946, Keitel wrote about the events of January, 1938, saying that
he had had the time neither to reflect on the events during these
hectic days nor to be aware of the type of "Trojan horse" with which
he had burdened himself. 37
The answer to the question why Keitel accepted the position of
Chief of Staff appears to be that he felt at the time that the important thing was to maintain the unified command of the Armed
Forces while at the same time he was quite obviously taken in by
Hitler's emotional appeal. There is no evidence that Keitel agreed
to Hitler's offer because he was a National Socialist or because he
desired the position for selfish reasons. Eight years later Keitel
wrote: "No man could foresee how inextricable my task would be
and that I would one day become the object of Hitler's uninhibited
dictatorship." 38
Rather than becoming the ministerial secretary, Keitel thus found
himself in a position which required qualifications which he, by
his own admittance, did not possess. 39 "What they [Keitel and
Jodi] obviously failed to realize was that, with Hitler's assumption
of command over the W ehrmacht, the staff of OKW had lost the
purely military character which it had hitherto preserved. . . .
[It] became henceforth the 'working staff' or . . . military
bureau of Hitler, the politician." 40
36. General Colonel Jodl's official diary, entry of January 26, 1938, IMT, XXVIII,
356-357; January 27, ibid., 358-359.
37. "Memoirs 1933-1938," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 113.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 99.
40. Warlimont, Inside Hitler'a Headquarters, p. 12.
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That the OKW was hardly ever any more than a military bureau

is now widely recognized. 41 But at the time of the change in the

structure of the Armed Forces leadership and indeed up to the end
of the Trials before the International Military Tribunal, the opinion
persisted that the OKW was an agency of considerably greater
significance. 42 Although Hitler had given Keitel assurances that
he "would never take a decision affecting the W ehrmacht without
first hearing the views of his Chief of Staff," 43 he made little effort
to do so and gradually reduced Keitel to a position of head clerk in
his military bureau. 44 Just how sincere Hitler was in his promise to
consult Keitel in important matters was demonstrated at the famous
Berghof conference between Hitler and Chancellor Kurt von
Schuschnigg on February 11, 1938. Keitel was ordered to the Berghof without receiving a reason. Upon his arrival, Keitel was informed that Hitler was going to have a talk with the Austrian
Chancellor in order to clear up some difficulties between the two
governments and that he wanted some generals present to "impress"
Schuschnigg. The generals were not asked to participate in nor did
they know the precise object of the conferences. 45 During a pause
in the afternoon session Schuschnigg left the conference room to
consult with another Austrian official. When Hitler suddenly began
to shout for Keitel, the General presented himself and asked for
orders. Hitler merely grinned and replied: "There are no orders.
I just wanted you here." 46 Keitel realized his function then, namely
to play a part in Hitler's attempt to intimidate the Austrian Chancellor. Neither in this instance nor in the case of Germany's march
into Austria in March, 1938, was Keitel consulted. In the latter case
he was ordered to prepare for possible military intervention two
days before the beginning of the campaign. 47
Hitler's reasons for selecting Keitel as Chief of the OKW sheds
some interesting light on his true intentions in relation to the OKW
and Keitel's functions within that body. Field Marshal von Blomberg said at Nuremberg that he discussed the question of his successor with Hitler during his last visit to the Chancellery. Von
Blomberg was apparently hesitant to name a successor when Hitler
41. Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitlef' als militae1'ische1' Fuehref': Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2d ed. rev.; Frankfurt
am Main: Athenaeum Verlag, 1965), p. 163.
42. Appendix B of Indictment, Statement of Criminality of Groups and Organizations,
IMT, I, 83-84.
43. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 14.
44. B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow &
Co., 1948), p. 88.
45. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 117.
46. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, trans. Brian Connell (London: Andre Deutsch, 1952),
p. 417.
47. "Memoirs, 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 178.
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suddenly asked him for the name of "'that general who's been in
your office up to now?' Von Blomberg replied: 'Oh, Keitel; there's
no question of him; he's nothing but the man who runs my office.'
Seizing on this straight away, Hitler said at once: 'That's exactly
the man I'm looking for.' " 48
Hitler knew little of the man he wanted to succeed von Blomberg.
Considering the fact that Hitler apparently agreed to an unknown
man as successor to the highest military post in the nation, an
unkown man in whose political attitudes he was not interested and
of whose other qualifications he had just received an estimate that
he was hardly suitable for the position, it seems reasonable to say
that Hitler looked upon Keitel as either a stop-gap appointment or
a figurehead. His subsequent performance before Keitel seems to
have been put on for the purpose of instilling confidence in Keitel
and leading him to believe that he intended to carry through
Blomberg's reforms.
The significance of the events of February 4, 1938, can hardly
be overestimated. The German public was never informed of the
true reasons for the dismissals of von Blomberg and von Fritsch.
An official communique mentioned only that certain changes in
personnel had taken place. 49 The Voelkischer Beobachter spoke
at length about the significance of the events. It emphasized that
the changes in personnel were not accidental but the "visible
expression of an organized and planned development." The paper
interpreted the changes in command by saying, "The process of
amalmagation between Army and Party is taking now a clearer
organizational form. It is becoming increasingly clear that the
leadership principle of the National Socialist state in its political
and military character goes back to a single military source of
power." 50 Hermann Goering's promotion to General Field Marshal
was seen as a symbolic act; "it represented the betrothal of the
soldierly spirit of the National Socialist movement to its political
will." 51
At the same time, the Army paper W ehrmacht commented on the
events of February 4 in a considerably less enthusiastic manner.
This paper merely pointed out that the changes in the structure of
the W ehrmacht leadership served to simplify the existing "organiza48. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 13; Affidavit by von Blomberg on
February 16, 1946, IMT, XL, 407-408.
49. H ermann Mau and Helmut Krausnick, Deutsche Geschichte der juengsten V ergangenheit 1933-1945 (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Herman Leins; Stuttgart: J. B.
Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964 ), p . 62.
50. Hermann Foertsch, Schuld und Verhaengnis: Die Fritsch-Krise im Fruehjahr 1938
als W endepunkt in der Geschichte der N ationalsozialistischen Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlagsantalt, 1951 ), p. 109.
51. Ibid., p. 110.
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tional monstrosity" and mentioned Keitel as the first adviser of Hitler
in questions relating to the unified preparation for defense. "There
is no doubt," the paper said, "that next to the organizational simplification, the whole Wehrmatch is closer to Hitler. He is now, without an intermediary agency, the Supreme Commander." 52
The military leaders in their political nai:Vete saw in the events
of February 4, 1938, little more than a solution to an organizational
problem. The more astute political leaders, however, realized that
the integration of the Armed Forces into the totality of the Third
Reich was well on its way. These differences in interpretation are
an indication of the ambiguity of Keitel's position.
52. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
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CHAPTER

IV

The Traditional Soldier in the
Totalitarian State
In the course of the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany, the defense counsel for Keitel, Dr. Otto Nelte, submitted a chart which
showed the OKW in the form of a pyramid:
The

FUEHRER
as

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE

ARMED FORCES
with the military staff.
"HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES"
( heading the staff)
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel.

The base of the pyramid showed eleven different offices representing the various agencies of the High Command. 1 In an affidavit
submitted by the defense to the Tribunal, Keitel explained that the
OKW was the highest administrative office for the Armed Forces
but that for operational and strategic matters, the OKW maintained
only a few offices such as the Armed Forces Leadership Staff and
the Foreign and Counter Intelligence Office whose services were
used by the three branches of the Armed Forces. On the other
hand, the OKW used the specialized departments of the Services
either to work out the details of plans which, in their rough outlines,
had been suggested to them by Hitler through the OKW or to
transmit plans and suggestions of the Services to Hitler. The problem with this arrangement, Keitel pointed out, was that the Services
found ways to circumvent the OKW and to win Hitler's approval
of proposals of which the OKW had no prior knowledge. Under
these conditions it is not surprising that Keitel found it extremely
difficult to maintain the authority of his office. Keitel further testified that because of conflicting demands by the three branches of
the Services, he found himself in the unwelcome position of a
1. Document Keitel-I (a), IMT, XL, 350-351.
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mediator. A third factor complicating his position was Hitler's
unwillingness to adhere to orderly procedures as well as his habit
of spontaneous intervention in strategic and administrative matters. 2
Keitel's testimony at Nuremberg stood in sharp contrast to his
rank of Generalfeldmarschall and Chief of the OKW: he could
hardly be called Hitler's first adviser. One former member of the
OKW went so far as saying that the entire OKW had "no ~uthority
other than that which Hitler was occasionally willing to lend it." 3
Other witnesses who were familiar with the situation within the
OKW testified to the fact that Keitel's influence on the formulation
of orders was insignificant and that his powers were extremely
limited. 4 But not everyone testified in this manner. In the testimony
of Dr. Hans Bernd Gisevius, former Gestapo officer and wartime
OSS ( Office of Strategic Services) collaborator, 5 Keitel was characterized as one of the most influential men in the Third Reich and as
a man who exerted great influence on the Armed Forces. However,
this testimony was thoroughly discredited during the trial. 6 In
substance, the Keitel affidavit seems to be correct.
Perhaps because of the discrepancy between his high rank and
his limited responsibilities, Keitel has fared poorly at the hands of
historians. To Trevor-Roper he was a "compliant puppet," to Telford
Taylor a "doormat," to Gordon Craig a "man of no character and
thorough going admirer of Hitler," and to Wheeler-Bennett a man
"of complete acquiescence and subservient adulation." 7 Judgments
of this sort, however, are difficult to substantiate.
Central to an understanding of Keitel's actions is his concept of
duty and loyalty, which was the product of a lifetime in military
service. In spite of the fact that Hitler did not appoint a Generalissimus and soon began to make a shambles of the kind of OKW for
which Keitel had worked, the General stayed on. General Walter
W arlimont observed that "he was honestly convinced that his
appointment required him to identify himself with the wishes and
2. Affidavit by Wilhelm Keitel of March 8, 1946, ibid., 355-361.
3. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-1945, trans. by R. H. Barry
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 17.
4. General Siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London: Cassell and
Company, Ltd., 1951 ), p. 46; Statement by Vice-Admiral L. Buerckner on June 28, 1946,
IMT, XL, 417.
5. Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the twenty-two defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966 ), p. 69.
6. Statement by Vice-Admiral L. Buerckner on June 28, 1946, IMT, XL, 417-418;
Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression, Supplement B, Final Argument by Dr. Otto Nelte ( 8 vols. and 2 supplementary vols. A and B; Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 242.
7. H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1947), p. 122; Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western
Europe, 1940 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 13; Gordon A. Craig, The
Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964),
p. 495; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics
1918-1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 429.
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instructions of his Supreme Commander, even though he might
not personally agree with them, and to represent them faithfully to
all those involved." 8 Although Keitel's relations with Hitler prior
to the war with the Soviet Union seem to have been relatively free
of friction, there were several incidents which indicated that Keitel
was not convinced-at least not then-that he was to act only as
Hitler's mouthpiece.
The first of these incidents occurred in connection with the proposed attack on France. Hitler's Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of
the War of October 9, 1939, requested the Commanders in Chief of
the three Services to submit detailed plans for an attack in the
West. 9 Opposition to such an attack on France at this time was
strong within the Armed Forces, and Keitel, who shared the view
of that opposition, went to Hitler on November 4 to present the
Army's case. Hitler accused him of obstructionism and of participation in a generals' conspiracy against him. "He demanded of me,"
Keitel wrote, "that I accept his views and represent them without
reservations to the High Command of the Army ( OKW) ." 1 Keitel
was deeply hurt, primarily, because Hitler doubted the quality in
himself of which he was most proud: his loyalty as a soldier. He
took the consequences of Hitler's accusations and asked for his
dismissal. A second conference followed in which Hitler told Keitel
that he rejected his request, that he furthermore did not wish to
receive such requests, and that it was Keitel's duty to do his job in
the position in which he, Hitler, had placed him. 11 General Walther
von Brauchitsch offered his opposition to Hitler's planned attack in
the West in the same manner on November 23, 1939. He received
a similar dressing down and offered his resignation which was subsequently rejected. 12
This incident was by no means the last clash between the Fuehrer
and his Chief of the OKW. When Hitler decided to entrust Gauleiter ( Party District Leader) Josef Terboven with the administration of the occupied Norwegian territory, Keitel again protested
and received another dressing down in front of the assembled officers at the daily situation conference. A second attempt to place
the administration of Norway in the hands of the Wehrmacht also
failed. 13

°

8. Warlimont, Inside H itler's H eadquarters, p. 13.
9. H. R. Trevor-Roper ( ed.) , Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hit ler's War Directives 1939-1945
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 13-14.
10. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Walter Goerlitz (ed.), Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: V erbrecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW ( Goettingen:
Musterschmidt Verlag, 1961), p. 223.
11. Ibid., p. 224.
12. Testimony by von Brauchitsch on August 9, 1946, IMT, XX, 575.
13. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 230.
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Another area of disagreement was over the role of Heinrich
Himmler's police force in the occupied areas. The OKW protested
vigorously against the arrival of Himmler's police detachments in
the occupied areas of Poland. Nothing could be done to prevent it,
since Hitler, who had already given his consent to Himmler, was
not to be swayed. Consequently during the planning for t}le attack
on the West, the OKW, having learned its lesson from Poland, took
steps to keep Himmler's police out of France. Hitler gave his consent to keep out Himmler's men, but Himmler managed to circumvent the restrictions of the OKW and created a special unit under
the command of the notorious Reinhard Heydrich: disguised in
field-gray Army uniforms and riding in vehicles with military license
plates provided by Himmler, Heydrich's detachment reached Paris. 14
In the light of these clashes between Keitel and Hitler, WheelerBennett's contention that "there is no evidence that Keitel ever
uttered the remotest query to a single decision of the Fuehrer" is
without historical foundation. 15
In spite of his difficulties with Hitler, Keitel managed to continue
his assigned job. He admired Hitler's military abilities-things had
gone well so far-and he considered the conclusion of the armistice
with France as the zenith of his military career. The victory over
France was to Keitel "the hour of retaliation for Versailles, a sensation mixed with the proud awareness of a unique campaign and
the promise to honor and protect the soldierly honor of the vanquished." He was pleased about his promotion to Generalfeldmarschall, but he said that he was somewhat ashamed at the same
time: in his opinion this distinction should have been reserved for
field commanders only. 16
What Keitel admired in Hitler in the years before the war against
the Soviet Union was the military leader, the strong head of state,
and the man who had helped restore the strength of the Armed
Forces. Perhaps his judgment of Hitler's military abilities was due
to his limited understanding of strategy. On the other hand, some
military historians argue that Hitler was "one of the most knowledgeable and diversified military-technical specialists of his time." 17
Keitel's opposition to measures based upon ideological considerations, such as the appointment of Gauleiter Terboven or the use of
14. Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Hvrror, trans. by Mervyn Savill (New
York; Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1965 ), pp. 232-233.
15. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, p. 429.
16. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 235-238.
17. H elmut R eiber (ed.) , Lagebesprechungen im Fuehrerhauptquartier: Protokollfragm ente aus Hitlers militaerischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 (Muencben; Deutscher Tascbenbuch Verlag G. m. b. H. & Co. KG, 1963 ), p. 23; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als militaerischer Fuehrer: Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2d ed. rev.; Frankfurt am Main; Athenaeum Verlag, 1965),
pp. 57-58.
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SS Commandos 18 behind the front lines, shows that he had kept
himself relatively free of the ideology of the movement. The honors
and distinctions which he received were awarded to him by a
grateful Hitler for loyalty and devotion to his work.
General Field Marshal von Blomberg testified at Nuremberg that
"it is general knowledge that Hitler kept Keitel at his side because
he was convinced of his unconditional soldierly obedience and
loyalty." 19 General Jodi called him "an obedient and dutyful
soldier, too soft and too decent for Hitler-but upright, truthful and
helpful." 20 Another analysis of Keitel's character was offered by
Colonel General Franz Halder. It was more detailed and less
colored by years of friendly relations than J odl's: "He was extremely
industrious, literally a work animal, extremely conscientious in his
field, but in all he did he kept his personality out of it. .
Originally, and I can vouch for it, he was by no means blind to the
danger of Hitler. He fought persistently-persistently, but not
energetically enough against the growth of the SS." 21
Jodi, who worked closest with Keitel and perhaps knew him best,
also testified of many instances when Keitel opposed Hitler. "But
when Hitler then became rude and abusive, so that one had to be
embarrassed because of the junior officers present, he resigned
himself and avoided anything that could lead to such depressing
scenes. He took flight into his work." 22 One such incident which
perhaps best describes the kind of humiliation to which those in
the Fuehrer's environment were exposed was related by Halder:
"I can still hear Hitler's tone: 'Hey, Field Marshall' I asked Keitel
about that later. He broke down and declared with tears in his eyes:
'Halder, I am doing it for you [the Army] I Don't you understand?'
This indicates the path which brought him in connection with
criminal things-but a wicked man, as one would read at timesthat he was not." 23
Keitel himself offered evidence of his devotion to duty, not
ideology. Throughout his memoirs, letters, and testimony, he
stressed the point that his actions were guided by his sworn duty
to the Supreme Commander. "We understood our task to assist
Hitler in operative matters ordered and planned by him without
having anything to do with the political motives for these actions.
18. The SS ( Schutzstaffeln) consisted of certain military and police formations which
were under the command of Heinrich Himmler.
19. Affidavit by von Blomberg on February 26, 1946, IMT XL, 409.
20. Affidavit by Jodl on June 17, 1946, ibid., 422.
21. Peter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950), p. 115.
22. Affidavit by Jodl on June 17, 1946, IMT, XL, 421.
23. Peter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder, p. 116.

We were not asked to concern ourselves with them." 24 Although
Keitel admitted that certain elements in Hitler's program contributed greatly to the "soldierly education," he emphasized that this
meant by no means that he accepted the entire program of the
National Socialist Party. 25 This sentiment was a familiar one: the
officer remains above politics and accepts only those points in the
political program of the government which serve his class interests.
The fact that Keitel maintained this attitude to the very end indicates not only that he was unable to rid himself of the traditional
view of the Army's role in the state but also that he apparently did
not comprehend Hitler's role as the leader of a revolutionary
movement.
Hitler's statement in 1933 that he believed in the concept of
Ueberparteilichkeit for the Armed Forces 26 had-at least in theory
-become meaningless by February 4, 1938, when he had merged
his political office with the office of Supreme Commander. In a
speech to the graduating Officer's Class of 1938, Hitler returned to
his old theme of creating a new and select class of politically and
racially suitable leaders. 27 In the fall of 1939, he told his military
commanders that the "creation of the W ehrmacht was possible only
in connection with the ideological education of the people through
the Party." 28
A study of the Constitution of the Armed Forces reveals the
extent to which the Armed Forces had become gleichgeschaltet:
"The office of the Fuehrer, not unlike the position of the monarch in
former times, constitutes a concentration of political and military
rights." The document goes on to say that the major differences
between the position of the monarch and the position of Hitler lies
in the fact that the monarch's basis was the army, whereas "the
position in which the Fuehrer stands and from which he speaks to
the people as well as to the W ehrmacht, is the position expressed by
the National Socialist people's movement, the Party."
The author of the document, Johannes Heckel, admitted that
there existed a "seemingly difficult" constitutional problem con24. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Otto Nelte, n . d. (Nelte F ile ) , Goerlitz, Keitel,

p. 395.

25. Ibid., p. 391.
2 6. Speech by H itler to the gener als on F ebruary 3 , 1933, in W alther H ofer (ed. ) . D er
Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Buecherei K. G.,
1957 ), p, 181.
27. Hitler's " Red e vor d em O.ffiziersjahrgan g 193 8" ( Speech to the entire year 's class
of officers) on January 25, 1939, in the Reich Chancellery, cited in Dr . H ans-Adolf Jacobsen
and Dr. W erner Jochm ann ( eds. ), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1945 (Bielefeld: Neu e G esellschaft G. m. b. H ., 1961 ) , n. p.
28. Speech by Hitler on November 23, 1939 , to the Comm anders of the Armed Forces,
ibid.
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cerning the position of this "political leader" to the Armed Forces.
But he quickly offered the solution: "He [the Fuehrer] represents
a new type of head of state. He is neither professional
soldier nor civilian, but a political fighter who assembles the people
as his followers around himself.
The power of the military
command is therefore nothing but the military-technical expression
of the already existing right of the Fuehrer." 29
The Constitution of the Armed Forces conceded that the "legalistic thinking of the past" would demand a guarantee for the separation of political from military power but added that "our constitutional and administrative law knows neither normative nor institutional guarantees. We do not have a guardian of the constitution.
We have no supreme court because we have been taught
by past experience that these are bound to fail. In accordance with
the personalized order of our legal existence we see that guarantee
in Hitler. It is his task and no one knows better than he does
how he must lead the Armed Forces." 30 Hitler, as Fuehrer and
Supreme Commander of the W ehrmacht, could thus quite legitimately dress ideological goals in military orders and demand their
execution according to principles of soldierly obedience, which
derived from the general duties of the citizen. 31
Keitel apparently never comprehended the implications of the
Constitution of the Armed Forces as to his own position. He admitted that the Army was penetrated by National Socialist ideas,
but at the same time stubbornly insisted "that we [the generals in
the OKW] had nothing to do with the Party." 32 He fits well into
the picture of the German officer which Lieutenant Fabian von
Schlabrendorff, one of the active members of the resistance within
the Army, drew after the war: "One of the main strengths of the
German officer was his military one-sidedness. The normal German
But in his
officer worked and lived in his profession. .
strength lay his weakness. His military one-sidedness made him
incapable of passing judgment on anything outside his field, especially political matters." 33
29. Johannes H eckel, W ehrverfassung und W ehrrecht d es Grossdeutschen Reiches,
Paragraph 83, ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and H elmut Krausnick,
Anatomie d es SS-Staates (2 vols.; Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter Verlag, 1965),
I, 273.
32. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Otto N elte, n. d. (Nelte File ), Goerlitz, Keitel,
p. 391.
33. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Ofjiziere gegen Hitler (Frankfurt am Main : Fischer
Buecherei K. G., 1962), p. 103.
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CHAPTER

V

The Failure of an Ideology
The year 1941, not unlike the year 1938, was to bring a new turning point in the relations between the NSDAP and the Armed
Forces. France had fallen in 1940, and Hitler, after a brief Balkan
interlude, turned his attention in 1941 to his ideological enemy of
long standing-Communism in the USSR. In the course of that
turbulent year, Hitler personally took command of the Army while
the military establishment as a whole found itself drawn closer into
the ideology of the movement. ·
On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 21, "Case
Barbarossa": "The German Armed Forces must be prepared, even
before the conclusion of the war against England, to crush Soviet
Russia in a rapid campaign." 1 Possible military action against the
Soviet Union had been the subject of a conference between Hitler
and a number of top military leaders as early as July 31, 1940.2
Concerned about the lack of troops for a campaign of this magnitude, Keitel sent a memorandum to Hitler in which he warned of
a possible two-front war and of the danger of American intervention.
The tone and content of Hitler's reply were such that Keitel once
again asked for his dismissal and transfer to the front. Hitler, as
usual, rejected his request. 3
The war against the Soviet Union, unlike any of the preceding
campaigns, bore a very definite ideological character. According
to notes made by General Halder during Hitler's speech to the
military leaders on March 28, 1941, Hitler described the coming
conflict as a battle of ideologies in which Communists should not
be treated as soldiers: the goal of the conflict was the destruction of
the Communist intelligentsia. Commissars and members of the GPU
( Soviet Secret State Police), Hitler said, were criminals and must,
therefore, be treated as such. 4 Perhaps in anticipation of opposition
from the military, he ended his speech, saying, "I do not demand
1. Directive No. 21, "Case Barbarossa,'' cited in H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Blitzkrieg
to Defeat: Hitler's War Directives 1989-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965), p. 49.
2. Walter Goerlitz (ed.), Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: V erbrecher oder O{fizier?
Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW (Goettingen: Musterschmidt Verlag,
1961 ), p. 242, n. 10.
3. "Memoirs 1938-1945,'' ibid., p. 244.
4. Halder diary entry of March 30, 1941, cited in Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden
und Proklamationen 1982-1945, Vol. II: Untergang (2 vols.; Muenchen: Sueddeutscher
Verlag, 1965), 1682.
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that the generals understand me, but I do demand that they obey
my orders." 5 The ideological character of the coming war was
further expressed in a series of special orders, notably the "Commissar Order." This order declared that captured Soviet officials
and political Commissars would be treated as criminals and not as
prisoners of war. When captured, they were to be shot on•the spot
or turned over to the Field Sections of the SD ( Security Service) .6
The actual formulation of these orders began with a Fuehrer
Directive to the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, which charged
him with carrying out "special tasks" in the conquered areas. 7 By
order of Hitler, OKW then included in its Guidelines to Directive
No. 21 the provision that the Reichsfuehrer SS was to perform "special tasks in preparation for the political administration [ of the
conquered areas]" within the operational area of the Armed Forces. 8
Military actions thus became connected with purely political actions,
and the Armed Forces were caught in an undertaking which was
guided by racial and ideological considerations. 9
Keitel's involvement in the formulation of these orders is difficult
to determine. General Warlimont held that "there was only one
man, Hitler, who was both officially and personally involved in the
authorship and drafting .
.; his unhappy Chief of OKW was
also involved but only as a recipient." 10 But in a memorandum to
his defense counsel, Keitel wrote: "I do not deny that I have had
knowledge of all these orders, regardless of whether I signed them
or not. I do not deny that Hitler talked about them with me and
Colonel General Jodl and that I transmitted them and supervised
their execution." 11 Keitel claimed that he attempted to resist these
orders because he was afraid that, as in Poland, Himmler would
"abuse these measures to establish order behind the front." 12 At
Nuremberg, Keitel admitted that he and the other generals should
have resisted these orders, "but we saw only the military situation
as it was; we let ourselves be guided by this as well as
the
suggestive powers of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander who
5. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 258.
6. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's H eadquarters 1939-1945, trans. by R. H. Barry
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 161. The SD (Sicherheitsdienst)
or Security Service was an agency of the Reu:hsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
H einrich Himmler. The function of the SD in the East was to prepare the way for the
future political settlement of the conquered areas. See Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The
Russian German Conflict, 1941-1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965),
p. 61.
7. Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegfuehrung 1940-1941 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer W ehrwesen, 1965), pp. 523-524.
8. Guidelines to Directive No. 21, IMT, XXVI, 54.
9. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 525-526.
10. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 170.
11. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Nelte, Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 395.
12. "Memoirs 1938-1945," ibid., p. 259.
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had impressed us greatly with his success in Poland and France." 13
In his final plea before the International Military Tribunal, Dr.
Otto Nelte said that his client knew the criminal nature of the orders
in question but that he was unable to evade them. 14 Evasion under
the circumstances would have meant either resignation, disobedience, or, in the extreme, suicide. Attempts to resign had proven
futile in the past. At one occasion Hitler had driven Keitel _to a
suicide attempt, but Jodl managed to take his pistol from him in
time. 1 5 To disobey Hitler's orders, however, appears to have been
unthinkable for Keitel.
The conflict with the USSR signified not only the penetration
of military considerations with ideological concepts but also a new
arrangement in the structure of the High Command of the Armed
Forces. General Halder noted in his diary entry of December 15,
1941: "First serious discussion with the Commander in Chief [von
Brauchitsch] regarding the situation; he is most depressed and sees
no way out of the situation." 16 Two days later, von Brauchitsch
resigned, a sick and broken man. 17 The situation created by the
resignation of the Commander in Chief of the Army was not unlike
the one on February 4, 1938. Hitler saw an opportunity and
quickly announced that thenceforth he was in personal command
of the Army in the Eastern theater of war. His "Proclamation
Concerning the Change in the High Command" explained in its
introductory section that his assumption of the office of Commander
in Chief of the Army was "the logical development" of his decree of
February 4, 1938. The second part of the proclamation was addressed to the "Soldiers of the Army and the W affen SS," and it
exhorted the troops to stay firm in their "loyalty and obedience." 18
Hitler's comment to Halder on the changes of command indicated
his hardly veiled contempt for the traditional work of general staff
officers: "That little bit of operations work anyone can do. The job
of Commander in Chief of the Army is to educate the Army in the
National Socialist spirit. I don't have a single Army general who
would do that job in my sense. I have therefore decided to take
command of the Army myself." 19 This was one of those rare
13. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Nelte, ibid., p. 393.
14. Office of United States Chief Counsel for Pros ecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi
Conspiracy and A ggression, Supplement B, Final Argument by Dr. Otto Nelte ( 8 vols. an d
two supplem entary vols. A and B; Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946 ) ,
p. 242.
15. T estimony of Jodi, on June 6, 1946, IMT, XV, 440.
16. Halder diary entry of D ecember 15, 1941, cited in Warlimont, Insid e H itler's
H eadquarters, p. 212.
17. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 286.
J~is~i'.'erlautbarung u eber den Okerkommandowechsel," cited in Domarus, Hitler, II,
181
19, P eter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder (Wiesbad en: Limes Verlag, 1950 ), pp. 214-215.
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admissions by Hitler that the Party, in spite of its clamoring about
the National Socialist W ehrmacht, had failed to convert even the
generals.
As a result of the changes in the command of the Army, the
entire organization of the Armed Forces, which had already been
unduly strained by Hitler's arbitrary methods, entered an· accelerated process of disintegration from which it never recovered. General Adolf Heusinger recalled the situation: "No one is at the
moment responsible for training, organization, replacements, administration. . . . Keitel is supposed to undertake the greater
part of these difficult jobs, to some extent as Hitler's deputy. Soon
he won't know whether he is Chief of the OKW or Deputy Commander in Chief of the Army." 20 Warlimont claims that no one
ever defined which areas of competence of the Army's Commander
in Chief were now to be handled by Keitel. To complicate matters
even further, the responsibility of the Army High Command was restricted to the Eastern front, and as far as operations were concerned, there was no longer a unified command of the Armed Forces.
Apart from Hitler, no one had any authority over all the forces of
the Army and, therefore, over the reserves, and no one else could
order movements of troops from one theater of war to another. 21
In short, Hitler, as Supreme Commander, was conducting strategy
in all theaters of war, while at the same time, as Commander in
Chief of the Army, he was conducting operations in the Eastern
theater of war. 22
Keitel's position under the new arrangement defies an exact
definition: technically he was still the Chief of the OKW. But the
Armed Forces Leadership Staff of the OKW was no longer used
for the Eastern front, where Hitler preferred to deal directly with
the General Staff of the Army. Keitel said at Nuremberg that "the
Fuehrer dealt knowingly and purposely in two ways: he wanted
certain competition concerning the disposition of troops and the
distribution of ordnance supplies of all kinds in order to have personal inside knowledge to reach his own final decision." 23 The Field
Marshal was fully aware of the abnormality of this situation and
attempted to convince Hitler to appoint a successor to von Brauchitsch; when this was rejected, he attempted another organizational
solution which was designed to bring some order and stability into
20. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee,
1923-1945 (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, 1957), p. 155.
21. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 216.
22. Statement by Keitel "The Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW" on
October 9, 1945, Nazi Conspfracy and Aggression, VIII, 676.

23. Ibid.

40

the confused situation. It, too, was rejected by Hitler without an
explanation. 24
It appears that after December 19, 1941, Keitel was completely
removed from strategic and operative tasks, an area in which Jodl
became more and more Hitler's sole adviser. 25 Although he attended
the daily situation conferences with Hitler, J odl, the Chief of the
General Staff of the Army, and other guests, Keitel's role there, as
can be seen from the records of the conferences, consisted mainly
in asking questions to clarify minor points or in supplying details
of information on administrative and logistical problems. 26 He no
longer had any influence on appointments to positions in the Wehrmacht: this role had been taken over by Lieutenant General Rudolf
Schmundt. 27 In this "mixture of cloister and concentration camp," 28
the "Fuehrer Head Quarters," Keitel played his part as Hitler's
"lightning rod" 29 and military secretary. But nothing indicates that
his devotion to his duty or his loyalty to the Supreme Commander
was affected by his humiliating position. On the contrary, as Hitler's
suspicion of the generals increased and as his military fortunes
declined, Keitel reassured him of his loyalty and continued to defend
his decisions against criticism from outsiders. 30
The increasing influence of National Socialist ideology on the
nature of the war became apparent with a Fuehrer Decree of
March 1, 1942, addressed to all departments of the Party, the State,
and the Armed Forces. In it, Jews, Freemasons, "and their allies"
were referred to as the cause of the present war and therefore, so
the decree reads, "the systematic spiritual battle against these forces
is a task necessitated by the war." Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg
was entrusted to conduct investigations of confiscated materials
from lodges, synagogues, and Jewish archives with the consent of
the Chief of the OKW. 31
In June, 1942, Keitel issued a letter in which he announced that
24. Manuscript by Keitel, "Stellung und Befugnisse des Chefs OKW," on August 15,
1945 (Nelte File), Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 317-322.
25. Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als militaerischer Fuehrer: Erkenntnisse und Erfahrongen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2d ed. rev.;
Frankfurt am Main: Athenaeum Verlag, 1965), p. 175.
26. Helmut Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen im Fuehrerhauptquartier: Protokollfragmente aus Hitlers militaerischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 (Muenchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag G. m. b. H. & Co. KG, 1963), passim.
27. Schramm, Hitler als militaerischer Fuehrer, p. 176.
28. Testimony by Jodi on June 3, 1946, IMT, XV, 295.
29. Affidavit by Hermann Goering on February 14, 1946, (Nelte File), Goerlitz,
Keitel, p. 271, n. 89.
30. Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder, p. 23; Major General Bernhard von Lossberg quoted
in Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 288, n. 144; Affidavit by Hermann Goering on February 14, 1946
(Nelte File), ibid., p. 271, n. 89.
31. Fuehrererlass of March l, 1942, cited in Walther Hofer (ed.), Der Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Buecherei KG 1957 ),
p. 248.
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Hitler had informed him that it was now necessary to bring about
"unconditional agreement in ideological matters" between the head
of state and the Officer Corps. Keitel wrote that he hoped to bring
the Officer Corps closer to its Supreme Commander and that, by
doing so, to strengthen the belief in the final victory and the will to
persevere. 32 Barely six weeks later, the High Command of the Army
issued an order, again over Keitel's signature, which provided for
the appointment of officers in charge of W ehrgeistige Fuehrung. 33
How effective these officers were in influencing the troops is difficult to determine. It seems though that the call for increased
political schooling found a favorable response with some troop
commanders. The Commanding General of the XIX Army Corps,
General Ferdinand Schoemer, issued a special order on February 1,
1943, on his own initiative, which was then distributed by the High
Command of the Army to all divisional commanders as a good
example of the new type of leadership. 34 General Schoemer stated
in this order that each officer under his command must establish
close relations with his men and that he must impress upon the
soldiers that the war against the USSR was an ideological war in
which there were only two alternatives, "total victory or death."
"It is obvious," he wrote, "that the war cannot be won with the
discipline of the old army alone. The soldier of to-day wins with
his weapons and his W eltanschauung." The nature of the previous
political instruction-at least in Schoemer's view-can be gathered
from his comment: "I absolutely forbid in the future the cheap
. I forbid these intelkind of lecture in prayer-mill style. .
lectual and high sounding lectures during which one soldier gets
his sound sleep and another one just sits there and looks stupid." 35
It seems doubtful that General Schoemer's example was followed
by many troop commanders. In December, 1943, OKW again had
to be told to increase the political education of the troops and to
cooperate with the Party Chancellery: Hitler ordered the creation
of a National Socialist Leadership Staff ( NSF Staff) within the
OKW and stated that "the Chief of the NSF Staff acts in the
execution of his office under my immediate command. He will
work in agreement with the NSDAP as the carrier of the political
32. Letter by Keitel to the Commander of the Armed Forces of June 1, 1942, in
Waldemar Besson (ed.), "Dokumentation: Zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialistischen
Fuebrungsoffiziers (NSFO)," Vierteliahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, IX (January, 1961), 84.
33. Order by High Command of the Anny of July 15, 1942, ibid., pp, 84-85. The
term wehrgeistige Fuehrong literally means "leadership in the spirit of national defense."
It was used in the beginning stages of the program as a euphemism for the training of
political fanatics.
34. Ibid., p. 78.
35. Special Order by the Commanding General of the XIX Army Corps of February 1,
1941, ibid., pp. 87-89.
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will." 36 This decree represents the final attempt to make the
W ehrmacht a National Socialist instrument of power. The mere
fact that it was necessary to create such an institution seems to indicate that National Socialist ideas had not gained the kind of foothold within the Armed Forces which was deemed necessary by the
Party.
In a report of December 20, 1944, Hauptbereichsleiter 37 Willy
Ruder stated that 1074 National Socialist Leadership Officers ( NSF
Officers) were employed on a full-time basis and 57,552 on a parttime basis. He also admitted that of the sixty-one General Staff
officers who had participated in special NSF training schools not
one was deemed suitable for future employment as an NSF Officer.
Ruder complained about their distinterested attitude and attributed
this to their traditionally Prussian outlook. 38 Hitler himself took an
active part in the re-education program at his own headquarters:
in a speech at the end of January, 1944, he encouraged his senior
officers to follow his leadership with greater determination as the
situation got worse. The response among the officers in Hitler's
environment to the NSF Program seems to have been mixed. For
example, General Warlimont wrote: "In HQ Area 2 we contrived
to avoid being subjected to this Party supervisory system in military
clothing, which significantly did not work through the 'normal
channels.' When the NSFO Headquarters asked us to accept an
NSFO Officer, the Staff Adjudant, who was a war-disabled colonel
replied: 'we've got no time here for such nonsense.'" 39
Keitel's involvement in the planning and execution of the NSF
Program was only marginal: he received the necessary orders and
transmitted them. When on January 7, 1944, General Hermann
Reinecke was appointed Chief of the NSF Staff in the OKW, Hitler,
Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Keitel, and several other officers participated in a conference in which Reinecke explained his plans for
the implementation of the Fuehrer Decree of December 22, 1943. At
one occasion during that conference Keitel attempted to dispel Hitler's fear that the NSF Officers might run into resistance from the
rank and file. When he attempted to make a suggestion as to the
appointment of an Army representative within the NSF Staff, Hitler
quickly suggested General Schoemer because he was a "fanatic."
Keitel agreed, saying that such a position should indeed be held by a
36. Fuehrer D ecree of December 22, 1943, ibid., p. 94.
37. The title Hauptb ereichsleiter is a Party rank. It is equivalent to the rank of
section chief within the Party Chancellery.
38. Draft of report "l Jahr nationalsozialistische Fuebrungsarbeit in der Wehrmacht,"
by Willy Ruder of December 20, 1944, Besson, "Dokumentation," p. 81, n. 7.
39. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 420.
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fanatic who could "fire up the men who are not doing their job." 40
The entire NSF Officer Program was significant in a number of
respects. It indicated that as late as 1944-1945 the Party had serious
doubts about the National Socialist attitude of the Armed Forces.
The fact that the NSF Leadership Staff in the OKW was directly
responsible to Hitler and Reichsleiter Bormann and not to J(eitel as
Chief of the OKW indicates that Hitler must have had doubts about
the OKW's willingness to carry out such a program. The NSF
Officer Program seems to have been dictated to a great degree by
the desperate military situation, although the leadership of the
program rejected such a notion. 41 But the timing of the program
and the concentration of the appeal on the troops indicate that the
overall objective was to instill in the troops a fanatical will to
resist the enemy and to hold the line. Wofuer Kaempfen Wir?, a
book especially approved by Hitler for the purpose of training
officers and men in the National Socialist spirit, provided an example. It contained, of course, the ideological windowdressing: the
Reich is a voelkische unit, the Germanic tribes had a heroic history,
the Lebensraum theme is of greatest importance, and the historic
mission of National Socialism _is to create a society for all those of
Germanic blood. But the essence of the book was its appeal to
loyalty and steadfastness in the face of the enemy: "We know
that the most fanatic enemy falters on an even more fanatic adversary. Neither the numbers nor the moral strength of the enemy
are inexhaustible.
Faith, loyalty, and an iron will
will give our weapons the victory." 42 The appeal made in this
work was essentially an appeal to the soldierly virtues, to unconditional obedience and loyalty; the ideological element played only a
secondary role.
In an order of August, 1944, General Reinecke stressed this point
even more: "Considering the present situation, I must point out
that it is not the task of the NSF Officer to provide political education. He must instead concentrate on instilling fanaticism in the
troops." 48 This attitude had, in fact, already been voiced by Ruder
as early as April, 1944, when he quoted Hitler as saying that he
[Hitler] demanded that his officers be not "only" loyal to the Party
40. Record of Fuehrer Conference with General Reinecke, Martin Bormann, Keitel et al.,
on January 7, 1944, in Gerhard L. Weinberg (ed.), "Dokumentation: Adolf Hitler und der
NS-Fuehrungsoffizier ( NSFO )," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, XII ( October, 1964 ),
446-456.
41. Letter by the Commander of the Relief Army on May 14, 1943, Besson, "Dokumentation," p. 90.
42. Wofuer Kaempfen Wir? cited in Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Dr. Werner Jochmann (eds.), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1945
(Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H., 1961), n. p.
43. Letter from General Reinecke of August 3, 1944, Besson "Dokumentation," p. 113.

44

and its goals but that the officers must be the "most fanatic representatives of the National Socialist State." 44
Although it is not possible to measure in any significant way the
actual influence of the NSF Program on the Armed Forces, the
increasing emphasis on loyalty and obedience in the appeals of the
NSF Staff during the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 seems
to indicate that ideological training as a means to instill fanaticism
was by and large a failure. Barely a month before the collapse of
the Third Reich, a party official who had a chance to observe the
effects of the NSF Program wrote to his superior about the lack of
conviction in the ranks even of the NSF Officers. He appealed to
his superior to see to it that the control of the program be removed
from the Fuehrer Head Quarters and given directly to Reichsleiter
Bormann: "Only the Party can now force a decision," he thought. 45
44. Speech by Willy Ruder to high ranking party functionaries on F ebruary 23, 1944,
in Munich, ibid., p. 106.
45. Memorandum to Hauptamtsleiter H einrich Walkenhorst from Pg. Buergel of April 4,
1945, ibid., p. 116.
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CHAPTER VI

Conclusion
The rise of National Socialism as an all-embracing philosophy of
life constituted perhaps the most far-reaching impact on recent
German history. It swept into power an unknown Austrian corporal
and enabled him to become the unlimited dictator of Europe
within a few years. In Germany the National Socialist revolution
with its avowed goal of Gleichschaltung affected every aspect of
life and every institution of society. Even the German Army, traditionally a power in itself, was unable to keep aloof from the revolutionary dynamics of the National Socialist movement.
Although the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic attempted to
play the traditional role of a state within the state by attempting to
stay ahove politics, the promises of Adolf Hitler to restore the Army
to its former position of power struck a responsive chord in the
Corps of Officers. His pseudo-military bearing and language, his
hatred of the Social Democratic "system," and his ability to arouse
enthusiasm in an apathetic Corps of Officers made the Reichswehr
leaders forget, that once started, a revolution of this kind would
not stop at the barracks' gates. Their political ignorance, fostered
by their traditional distaste for anything political, proved to be an
invaluable asset for a manipulator of Hitler's skills. The Fuehrer
went to great lengths to prove his good will towards the Army.
When he eliminated Ernst Roehm and his SA, Hitler fulfilled the
Army's greatest desire: to be once again the only arms bearer in
the Reich.
But Hitler's gift to the military leaders proved to be a Trojan
horse. The independence of the Reichswehr was threatened when
the 100,000 man army was flooded with conscripts of a new generation who carried the seeds of the revolution into the once tightly
controlled Reichswehr. A second attack on the "state within the
state" came from another direction. Scandals and trumped-up
charges as well as outright murder removed a number of leading
personalities within the Reichswehr until the conditions were ripe
for Hitler's second move: the assumption of direct command over
the Armed Forces on February 4, 1938. With this political masterstroke the High Command of the Armed Forces was quietly changed
from an agency with relative independence from politics into a tool
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for Hitler, the politician. Wilhelm Keitel, an efficient bureaucrat,
who, like most of his fellow officers, did not comprehend that he
was participating in a revolution, was elevated to the post of Chief
of the High Command. Although the Party boasted of having
created a National Socialist Wehrmacht, neither Keitel nor most of
the generals were National Socialists. The key factor in Hitler's
gaining direct control of the Armed Forces was his skillful ~anipulation of power and his uncanny sense of timing rather than his
ability to sway the generals to a National Socialist point of view.
"Nothing convinces the soldier as quickly as success," Keitel once
said. 1 The military successes in Poland and France undoubtedly
served well to establish the Army's con.fidence in its self-appointed
leader and Supreme Commander. The military conflict with the
Soviet Union demanded, however, not only that the Army have
confidence in Hitler's military leadership but that it identify with
the ideological causes of this war: the extermination of the socalled ''biological basis of Bolshevism." Hitler realized that the
ideological commitment of his generals and of the Army as a whole
was sadly lacking. The resignation of General von Brauchitsch in
1941 seemed to provide an answer to this problem. Rather than
appoint a successor Hitler repeated his performance of February 4,
1938, and personally took command of the Armies in the East to
educate the troops in the National Socialist spirit. The High Command of the Armed Forces was reduced to playing the part of a
military secretariat with drastically curtailed responsibilities.
The Chief of the OKW, whose functions now seemed to be dictated mostly by Hitler's needs, rather than the Army's, became a
pathetic figure: disliked by most field commanders and humiliated
by Hitler, he was yet unable to free himself from his traditional
concepts of honor and duty. "Loyalty is the core of honor" 2 had
been his motto throughout his military career; he was proud of
having been Hitler's "faithful shieldbearer." 3 Keitel attempted to
reconcile his participation in criminal and unsoldierly acts with his
code of honor by pointing to his sworn duty to unquestioning obedience. Whether he ever reconciled these acts with his conscience
could not be determined.
Hitler's attempt to educate the Army in the spirit of National
Socialism must be called a failure. The last minute NSFO Program
was an admittance that the majority of the Army had not committed
1. Walter Goerlitz ( ed. ) , Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: Verbrecher oder Offi,zierP
Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW (Goettingen: Musterscbmidt Verlag,
1961 ), p. 406.
2. Ibid., p. 434.
3. Ibid., p. 405.
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itseH to the ideology of the Party. The failure of the NSFO Program was demonstrated by the fact that its appeals fell largely on
deaf ears. With the worsening military situation in 1944, the ideological element in the program was gradually replaced by attempts
to instill a kind of nihilistic fanaticism in the troops. As for Keitel,
he appears rather as the prototype of the unpolitical military professional who, steeped in the concepts of another age, found himseH
involved in issues outside his field of specialization. Like most
other military leaders he continued to do his job and ignored the
moral issues involved in being "the devil's general," because there
was no one to tell him how to resolve them. Hitler's attempt to
create a National Socialist Army through a slowly evolving program
of political indoctrination beginning in 1933 was a failure. Although
the pressures of the Eastern campaign brought in their wake an
intensification of Party influence, the Army remained essentially
unchanged.
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